JFK Assassination System
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

GORDON GRAY

450-2

Box 458

[redacted]

To: Files
From: Frederick [redacted]
Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY
Date: 7/4/75

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Page	Subject
2262	Biographical background
2268	Opinions on PFIAB generally
2272	Never heard of Executive Action
2273	"I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations," (2272-3)
2273	In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the training of Cuban refugees"
2274	There was one "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor Vietnam". Gray says that "Agency polic was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything".
2275	"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government".
2276	At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wante the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations."
2278-9	Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congress al oversight committee because of danger of leaks
2281	Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In
2292	TRUJILLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Dom. Rep. wan high powered rifles with telescopic scopes and subseque received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Se of State through the DCI.
2293	Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eis hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. --"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

ToLxx Xxk Files
From: Frederick Baı
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ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

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These documents were pulled from a Special Group file by John Bayly. They should be replaced after we xerox those minutes we intend to use as exhibits for the Gray testimony.

Attached on top is copy of a CIA memo to be used as an exhibit.

BARON

July 8, 1975

GORDON GRAY

TOP SECRET

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background		Issues and Questions
1942-1947	U.S. Army (Private to Captain)	
1949-1950	Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army)	
1950-1951	Special Assistant to President TRUMAN	
1951	Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy Board, which involved close contact with intelligence community	
1951-1955	President, University of North Carolina	
1955	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA)	
1958	Director, Office of Defense Mobilization	
1958-1961	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)	
1961-1975	Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK	

Chronology of Events

1959

November 4	Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba Propaganda Project" for use of radio transmitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project would meet with high level approval" provided it was acceptable to the President of Mexico. (SG M[illegible])	GRAY represents President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings.

TOP SECRET

1960 (Cont'd)		Issues and Questions
February 12	A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day. The only record of this meeting in the NSC minutes states: "On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written." (NSC Minutes)	Why were no minutes written?
February 17	Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes)	Does context show that phrase "his associate" refers to President EISENHOWER?
March 9	GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of "whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes)	Did such consideration involve assassination plotting?
March 14	At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the leaders around CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes)	Was this "package deal" the simultaneous triple assassination plot that was mentioned on November 3, 1960?
	At a Special Group meeting, after a paper titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" was read, there was "a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO and CHE GUEVARA should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes)	Does this simultaneous disappearance plan refer to assassination planning? Is there a connection between this Special Group discussion and the NSC discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan to remove Cuban leaders?
April 7	"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic." Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military intervention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)	Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic?

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
April 14	At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious. . . [he] thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable development for us." (NSC Minutes)	Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO? DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S. had an active interest in removing TRUJILL(What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"?
April 14	Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO was an assassination that would make CASTRO a martyr. (NSC Minutes)	Does this show that assassination was not a favored alternative because it would produce martyrdom?
June 30	GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)	General atmosphere of vehement opposition to CASTRO.
July 1	Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The memo said: "approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."	Was the Special Group aware of this action Was the President aware of the plan? Purpose of weapons?
July 5	President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of State HERTER and others to discuss the Dominican Republic. "The President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution." (Conference Memorandum)	

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
July 7	Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the Venezuelan government wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. . . . [Because] they have convincing evidence that TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela] . . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it [his government] wants a showdown without delay." (NSC Minutes)	The U.S. was under pressure to move against TRUJILLO. Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT make him "fair game" for assassination in the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.
	"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even though CASTRO is the greater threat." (NSC Minutes)	
	The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT was told that the U.S. cannot act without ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S. will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that a government in exile should be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)	Did the U.S. determine a successor? Did the U.S. "act"?
July 21	GRAY said "his associates" would favor the development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes)	"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisenhower. Does sabotage imply the further steps of assassination?

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
July 28	President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting: "Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO." In this regard, "the President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation, we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)	Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?
August 12	BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before "higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes)	
August 16	Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21)	Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES aware of this?
August 25	After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this . . . It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)	Is this circumlocutious order for assassination from the President? An indication that at the least, assassination was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?
	At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS suggested that the U.S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful means." (NSC Minutes)	
August (approx)	BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation	Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd		Issues and Questions
September 8	During brief discussion of CONGO developments, "GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)	Against LUMUMBA personally?
September 21	Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that "LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of." (NSC Minutes)	Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of" LUMUMBA by assassination?
October 24	At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of October. The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO . . . (NSC Minutes)	Did this information prompt the U.S. to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?
November 3	At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT "asked whether any real planning has been done in taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without these three the Cuban government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously."	Was MERCHANT referring to an assassination of Cuban leaders?
	The minutes further state: "General CABELL pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cuban. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)	Shortly before this, CIA had made the assassination contract with the Mafia. Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA contract? Was General CABELL expressing a traditional CIA objection to assassination proposals? If so, on what other occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA objection?

		Issues and Questions
1960 (cont'd)		
December 29	At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the TRUJILLO regime, but "he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) (Source: Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott, of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960, 02752)	TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961. Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group propose to approve aiding Dominicans who might assassinate TRUJILLO to effect such a "decisive stroke"?
1961		
January 12	Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)	Were these assassination-type weapons? If not, was this Special Group action used as implicit authority for subsequent provision of weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO?
Late Jan.-Early Feb.	DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability, including the capability to assassinaate political leaders.	Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis tration?

GORDON GRAY: Short Summary

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO".

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions (see attached list of exhibits):

CASTRO

1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E)

2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14 Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"? (Exhibit at Tab F)

3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960, the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab O)

4. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960 Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)

5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether planning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)

TRUJILLO

1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination at the April 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H)

2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960, by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo opponents? (Exhibit at Tab YZ)

3. When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meeting to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)

4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available "small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 meeting)

5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)

LUMUMBA

1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)

2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960, that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at Tab S)

COMMAND and CONTROL

What was the command and control system for covert action operations in the Eisenhower Administration?

Pertinent Relationships

President Eisenhower	Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group).
DCI Allen Dulles	Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell	Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate Castro and the Executive Action capability.

FB/RKK
7/8/75

TO: Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE: July 6, 1975

SECRET

GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA;" provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:

- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?

- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER, Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?

- What were the general command & control practices?

Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:

- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

- Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS

President Eisenhower	Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group).
DCI Allen Dulles	Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell	Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability.
President Truman	Gray was Secretary of the Army and Special Assistant to the President
Livingston Merchant	Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs representing the State Department at Special Group meetings.

EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

3 November 1960

E-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements ~~for this~~.

7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960.

T. A. Parrott

THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET
EYES ONLY

15 aug 60

12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

SECRET - EYES ONLY

2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:

Political Action	$ 960,000.00	
Propaganda	2,152,120.00	
Paramilitary	8,055,753.00	
Intelligence Collection	833,200.00	
Counter Intelligence	325,400.00	
Communications Support	229,420.00	
Support	731,718.00	
	$ 13,287,611.00	Total

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY
SECRET

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PAPER NO. 220

SECRET
EYES ONLY

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/P C-3473

SECRET C-X-3

ER 60-5477

1 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership in the Dominican Republic.

1. This memorandum recommends action by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. Such recommendation is contained in para 5.

2. While Ambassador Farland was in the Dominican Republic, a principal leader of the opposition requested that a limited number of arms be made available which could be used to precipitate the overthrow of the regime of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. These arms presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime.

Within recent months, the Trujillo regime has become increasingly unstable due to growing opposition within the professional and middle classes to the excesses of the dictatorship. Political oppression of these groups has brought about severely strained relations between the Catholic Church and the Trujillo regime. Most knowledgeable sources have been predicting that the fall of the regime is imminent.

Since the fall of the Trujillo regime appears inevitable, is to the interest of the U.S. that our relations with the opposition be as close as possible. Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end.

3. It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic twelve (12) sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred (500) rounds of ammunition for same. Arms and ammunition are immediately available at MIDEAST depot; approximate cost is $2700. It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.

4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

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5. It is recommended that the opposition in the Dominican Republic be provided the arms as requested.

SIGNED

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

______________________ ____________
Deputy Director Date
(Plans)

The recommendation contained in paragraph 5 is approved:
SIGNED
____
Director of Central Intelligence

Date 2 JUL 1960

DDP/WH :klb (1 July 60)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - COPS
1 - C/WHD

29 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

3. Air Drops - Cuba

Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in the next three days.

5. Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

6. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET EYES ONLY

12 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

"3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday."

"5. Contingency Planning for Cuba

Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential step. Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th.

"7. Capture of Supplies in Cuba

In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.

✓9. Dominican Republic

Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.

✓11. U-2 Flights - Vietnam

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the three ~~successful~~ U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission to cover that area as soon as the weather permits.

The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results, for the meeting of the 19th.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

3 November 1960 E-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

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Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

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Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements ~~for this~~.

7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960.

THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET
EYES ONLY

15 Aug 60

12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

SECRET - EYES ONLY

2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:

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Support	731,718.00	
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EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET - EYES ONLY

E-3

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

SECRET - EYES ONLY

outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

√4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

THOMAS A. PARROTT

While agreeing that the Government could not take an official stand, Mr. Merchant expressed his personal opinion that if the companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any economic crisis that might be precipitated in this way.

Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro. Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it was possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any concerted across-the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in Cuba.

It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be held on Monday, March 14th, to consider what might and should be done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps Colonel Lansdale should attend.

There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to this letter has now been given the status of a JCS document but that it has not been forwarded to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.

Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed through the Scott office.

7 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 7 April 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell

3. Dominican Republic

Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting. General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for an orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, à la Batista.

Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo, specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic. General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such, to the country in the immediate aftermath of the demise or flight of Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the memory of the Marine occupation.

Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro effort to be an amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally

4. Cuba

Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing development of the Cuban situation. In this connection he expressed some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him that the top people in USIA are aware of CIA plans and there should be no crossing of wires.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

28 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group ~~Meeting, 28 April~~ 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles

Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an observer.

8. Cuba

Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been established to deal with the Cuban situation. He noted that a number of different groups and committees, with varying interests and objectives, are concerning themselves with this situation and that there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff" to whom all could look as a central point.

He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr. Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself of the general outlines of what has been going on in the Government. Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been decided upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability.

In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations with respect to Cuba.

Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at statements and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba. Mr. Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and described him as a "twisted personality."

19 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale; Gray; Dulles and Bissell

2. Cuba

Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated. Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S.

Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly in the U.N.

Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investigation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.

Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how effectively.

b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base.

c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift.

e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were.

Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. Gen. Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel were of the same opinion.

Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself.

Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case.

Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph.

The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.

✓3. <u>Advice to Assistant Attorney General</u>

Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of ~~suggested advice to~~ Mr. Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer, but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question, Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley, who appeared satisfied with the oral guidance.)

✓ 5. <u>U-2 for Cuba</u>

Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)

23 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 23 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and Bissell

2. Cuba

Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees. He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.

The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once. Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras be informed.

Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.

Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take place on the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.

Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

30 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray; Dulles and Bissell

2. Cuba

Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were agreed:

a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to make it possible to deny plausibly).

b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)

c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness. (Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's

SECRET - EYES ONLY

notice before any OAS committee actually visited Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is required DOD assistance might be necessary. Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary refugees should be kept in mind.)

Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever come to trial.)

Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desires with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be available to deal with the FRD and to talk to other Latin American governments.

After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, but responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official, preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department of State. There should be a sort of "board of directors" to oversee all aspects of the operation. This should be the Special Group plus Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered. (Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether

there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own organizational integrity.)

There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's associates.

Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and must be done by the Agency.

As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government status. Mr. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's talking to President Frondizi.

Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's associates.

Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request to the DOD for thirty-eight NCOs and officers for service outside the U.S.

TAParrott

THOMAS A. PARROTT

17 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 17 February 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles

Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.

1. Cuba

The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed at some length. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action would be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the identification and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval. Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would discuss it further.

(Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter with his associate. The latter had made two points:

a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, feeling that if it were successful in denying money to the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for subversive activities, the Cuban government could obtain offsetting funds from other sources.

b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this particular sabotage operation. He would agree that the Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents for a variety of possible tasks. He said that once this

SECRET - EYES ONLY

was done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. It was stipulated that in any case no action should take place until his return from the trip on which he is about to embark.

Mr. Scott also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point as outlined in b. above.)

2. Dominican Republic

There was a brief discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most interested in determining whether or not a sort of Third Force can be identified.

28 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles

2. Special Meeting on Cuba

Mr. Gray said that it is desired to set up a special meeting on Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had had a recent conference in the White House.

Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Douglas determine whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that Mr. Willauer would also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting. It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its charter. I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of our National security.

Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate this most serious matter.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER (and Under State	July 5, 1960	TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On July 5, 1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Herter, (and Under) Secretary of (State) ~~the Treasury~~ Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of internal intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The ~~President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution~~."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) — Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY, DOUGLAS DILLON	March 14, 1960	CASTRO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover."

"Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. ~~Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be package deal~~, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting, March 10, 1960 — Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY	April 14, 1960	TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: AT a National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice President Nixon presiding, ": 'Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious...(he) ~~thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust Trujillo~~."

"Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect... ~~if Trujillo could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us~~."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 14, 1960) — Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY	April 14, 1960	TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. ~~Dulles~~ reported that a SR. Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro: (~~1) an assassinatio[n] that would make Castro a martyr,~~ (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista terror regime.

Does this indicate that assass[ination] was not a favored alternative at NSC level?

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14 1960) FILE: - Abilene	Kelley DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES	July 7, 1960	TRUJILLO CASTRO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles stated: "The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo. An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact they have convincing evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassination attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/*** "Betancourt believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without delay." Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, July 7, 1960) - Abilene	Kelley DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES	July 7, 1960	TRUJILLO CASTRO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting ~~"Mr. Dulles stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of Trujillo must be settled before the problem of Castro can be dealt with, even though Castro is the greater threat."~~

The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's downfall.

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, July 7, 1960) FILE: - Abilene	Kelley DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER	July 28, 1960	CASTRO TRUJILLO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: On July 28, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting ~~President Eisenhower said: "Until Trujillo is eliminated, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with Castro."~~ It was noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic problems in OAS forms. On this matter, "The President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would be the loser."

Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960 FILE: Abilene	Kelley DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE STANS, MR. GRAY	Aug. 25, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might recognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15)

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August 25, 1960 FILE: - Abilene	Kelley DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY,	Sept. 21, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles said: "~~A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed~~. ***Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but ~~Lumumba was not disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of~~."

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960) FILE: - Abilene	Kelley DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY	Oct. 24, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles reported:

"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October. ~~The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned Mobutu...if he had not been warned, it was probable that he would have been caught."~~ (page 16)

X

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, October 24, 1960)	Kelley
FILE: - Abilene	DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS	Feb. 12, 1960	LUMUMBA CASTRO TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On ~~February 12, 1960~~ a "special" National Security Council meeting was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting series of minutes is a one-page notation which states: ~~"On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."~~

What was discussed? is NOT indicated in document.

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting, Feb. 12, 1960	Kelley
FILE: Abilene	DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE:	STAFF:
FILE:	DATE:

MOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:

short summary

If we don't re-write the Gray ~~chronology~~, you should note to the senators that since we w drafted it we have received a new batch of key documents from the Eisenhower library which <u>are</u> reflected (quoted) in the Gray Chronology.

Add NIXON to short summary

To: Files

From: Frederick Baron

Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960

Date: July 7, 1975

In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House, Wilderotter assured me xx that after the line "beyond our xx capabilities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo), followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals with Southeast Asia.

Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on page 3 that related to XCuba.

EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

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* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and (2) The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was President Eisenhower.

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

TO: Files

FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 5, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:

Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.

Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning; Goodpaster was responsible for spot work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he kept each other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower.

"I didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action of Eisenhower's."

2. Special Group Function

At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest, that was my role."

Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said, "I want the 54/12 committee to consider any action that impinges upon the sovereignty of another country."

Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would have been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffed out before Special Group meeting. "Most of the rest of us did not have a chance to reflect before the meeting."

Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12 (Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.

Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would have a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assassinations.

3. <u>"His Associate"</u>:

Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the Special Group minutes "Mr. Gray's associate" or "his associates". Gray's first reaction was that "his associates" would probably refer to members of his NSC staff.

But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes "his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.

Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was Parrott's phrase. Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be sure it referred to the President in each case. He said that when he attended the meetings,he would refer to "the President" directly.

(Note: Since the phrase "the President" is never used in Parrott's minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to "Mr. Gray's associate" are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)

NSC DOCUMENTS

Gray recalls that the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles, into his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that Dulles was not present at this meeting. He knows that he would have told Dulles shortly afterwards.

Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings. Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance, by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the

meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for the NSC, along with Jimmy Lay, Gray's assistant.

LUMUMBA

Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at which it was reported that Gray commented that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action" in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.

However, Gray does remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to see him removed from his position of responsibility."

In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said 'straightforward action', certainly assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen DULLES was consistently in opposition to assassination and "he was probably saying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."

With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of 1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or said words to that effect.

Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA with TWEEDY.

TOP SECRET

TRUJILLO

"I am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the assassination of TRUJILLO."

"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group. The DCI should have taken a suggested course of action to the Special Group after checking with State."

Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an individual."

CUBA

Gray said that President EISENHOWER would frequently remark at meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that at some point during that period of time, Allen DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete plan." Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program: propaganda; economic sanction; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles. GRAY said the President approved this memo. (Note that Gray also said that he made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)

TOP SECRET

After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential meetings on Cuba. Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the memos. Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in reference to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military planning. EISENHOWER suggested that the page should be retyped to change the word "planning". Gray said they did retype the page.

Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no military "planning", definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.

President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among themselves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.

Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960, Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban operations over 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying this budget before "higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to President EISENHOWER.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960, at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said

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that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included assassination." Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the "usual DCI reaction".

Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said that "the special meeting" mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President. Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).

CASTRO/GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION, PHASE I

Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars. Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.

Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.

Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."
Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this

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matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never heard about such things.

EXECUTIVE ACTION

"I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to me."

ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY

Gray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination: (1) When NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump him off". But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. Assassination was not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one member consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership in Hanoi". Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the name to us.

"I followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray said that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called" the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such attempts.

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Interview Questions For Gordon Gray

TRUJILLO

1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting DCI Cabell recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM".

- Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have record of any authorization until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)

- If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed their authority?

- Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administration for handling the approval of such a project?
  - Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?
  - Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority by not requesting and receiving approval from the Secy of State
  - Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?

2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 1961. GRAY was present. The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside the Dominican Republic".
   - Do you remember this event? Are the minutes accurate?
   - What was the policy behind the approval?
   - Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?

To; Files
From: FDB
Re: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)
Date: 7/5/75

Biographical Background

1951-62 National Security Council staff member

1962-67 State Department, member of Policy Planning Council

Chronology of Events

Summer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that discussion, President EISENHOWER said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassination of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on."

- --Johnson said he might have omitted the statement from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.
- -- J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Room).
- --The formal record of decision by the NSC is unlikely to contain infommation on this subject, he said.
- --The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would be with President Eisenhower's papers.(10)

"I was surprised x...that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled."